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Summary: Philosophers and scientists are social epistemic agents. As such, they ought to 
behave in accordance with epistemic norms governing the behavior of social epistemic 
agents. 
 
 
In this paper, I reply to Markus Arnold’s comment and Amanda Bryant’s comment on my 
work “Can Kuhn’s Taxonomic Incommensurability be an Image of Science?” in Moti 
Mizrahi’s edited collection, The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive 
Transformation?. 
Arnold argues that there is a gap between the editor’s expressed goal and the actual 
content of the book. Mizrahi states in the introduction that his book aims to increase “our 
understanding of science as a social, epistemic endeavor” (2018: 7). Arnold objects that it is 
“not obvious how the strong emphasis on discounting Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis in 
the first part of the book should lead to a better understanding of science as a social practice” 
(2018: 46). The first part of the volume includes my work. Admittedly, my work does not 
explicitly and directly state how it increases our understanding of science as a social 
enterprise. 
According to Arnold, an important meaning of incommensurability is “the decision 
after a long and futile debate to end any further communication as a waste of time since no 
agreement can be reached,” and it is this “meaning, describing a social phenomenon, which is 
very common in science” (Arnold, 2018: 46). Arnold has in mind Kuhn’s claim that a 
scientific revolution is completed not when opposing parties reach an agreement through 
rational argumentations but when the advocates of the old paradigm die of old age, which 
means that they do not give up on their paradigm until they die. 
I previously argued that given that most recent past paradigms coincide with present 
paradigms, most present paradigms will also coincide with future paradigms, and hence 
“taxonomic incommensurability will rarely arise in the future, as it has rarely arisen in the 
recent past” (Park, 2018: 70). My argument entails that scientists’ decision to end further 
communications with their opponents has been and will be rare, i.e., such a social 
phenomenon has been and will be rare. On my account, the opposite social phenomenon has 
been and will rather be very common, viz., scientists keep communicating with each other to 
reach an agreement. Thus, my previous contention about the frequency of scientific 
revolutions increases our understanding of science as a social enterprise. 
Let me now turn to Bryant’s comment on my criticism against Thomas Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science. Kuhn (1962/1970, 172–173) draws an analogy between the 
development of science and the evolution of organisms. According to evolutionary theory, 
organisms do not evolve towards a goal. Similarly, Kuhn argues, science does not develop 
towards truths. The kinetic theory of heat, for example, is no closer to the truth than the 
caloric theory of heat is, just as we are no closer to some evolutionary goal than our ancestors 
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were. He claims that this analogy is “very nearly perfect” (1962/1970, 172). 
My objection (2018a: 64–66) was that it is self-defeating for Kuhn to use evolutionary 
theory to justify his philosophical claim about the development of science that present 
paradigms will be replaced by incommensurable future paradigms. His philosophical view 
entails that evolutionary theory will be superseded by an incommensurable alternative, and 
hence evolutionary theory is not trustworthy. Since his philosophical view relies on this 
untrustworthy theory, it is also untrustworthy, i.e., we ought to reject his philosophical view 
that present paradigms will be displaced by incommensurable future paradigms. 
Bryant replies that “Kuhn could adopt the language of a paradigm (for the purposes of 
drawing an analogy, no less!) without committing to the literal truth of that paradigm” (2018: 
3). On her account, Kuhn could have used the language of evolutionary theory without 
believing that evolutionary theory is true.  
Bryant’s defense of Kuhn’s position is brilliant. Kuhn would have responded exactly as 
she has, if he had been exposed to my criticism above. In fact, it is a common view among 
many philosophers of science that we can adopt the language of a scientific theory without 
committing to the truth of it. Bas van Fraassen, for example, states that “acceptance of a 
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (1980: 12). He also states that if 
“the acceptance is at all strong, it is exhibited in the person’s assumption of the role of 
explainer” (1980: 12). These sentences indicate that according to van Fraassen, we can 
invoke a scientific theory for the purpose of explaining phenomena without committing to the 
truth of it. Rasmus Winther (2009: 376), Gregory Dawes (2013: 68), and Finnur Dellsén 
(2016: 11) agree with van Fraassen on this account. 
I have been pondering this issue for the past several years. The more I reflect upon it, 
however, the more I am convinced that it is problematic to use the language of a scientific 
theory without committing to the truth of it. This thesis would be provocative and 
objectionable to many philosophers, especially to scientific antirealists. So I invite them to 
consider the following two thought experiments. 
First, imagine that an atheist uses the language of Christianity without committing to 
the truth of it (Park, 2015: 227, 2017a: 60). He is a televangelist, saying on TV, “If you 
worship God, you’ll go to heaven.” He converts millions of TV viewers into Christianity. As 
a result, his church flourishes, and he makes millions of dollars a year. To his surprise, 
however, his followers discover that he is an atheist. They request him to explain how he 
could speak as if he were a Christian when he is an atheist. He replies that he can use the 
language of Christianity without believing that it conveys truths, just as scientific antirealists 
can use the language of a scientific theory without believing that it conveys the truth. 
Second, imagine that scientific realists, who believe that our best scientific theories are 
true, adopts Kuhn’s philosophical language without committing to Kuhn’s view of science. 
They say, as Kuhn does, “Successive paradigms are incommensurable, so present and future 
scientists would not be able to communicate with each other.” Kuhn requests them to explain 
how they could speak as if they were Kuhnians when they are not Kuhnians. They reply that 
they can adopt his philosophical language without committing to his view of science, just as 
scientific antirealists can adopt the language of a scientific theory without committing to the 
truth of it. 
The foregoing two thought experiments are intended to be reductio ad absurdum. That 
is, my reasoning is that if it is reasonable for scientific antirealists to speak the language of a 
scientific theory without committing to the truth of it, it should also be reasonable for the 
atheist to speak the language of Christianity and for scientific realists to speak Kuhn’s 
philosophical language. It is, however, unreasonable for them to do so.  
Let me now diagnose the problems with the atheist’s speech acts and scientific realists’ 
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speech acts. The atheist’s speech acts go contrary to his belief that God does not exist, and 
scientific realists’ speech acts go contrary to their belief that our best scientific theories are 
true. As a result, the atheist’s speech acts mislead his followers into believing that he is 
Christian. The scientific realists’ speech acts mislead their hearers into believing that they are 
Kuhnians. 
Such speech acts raise an interesting philosophical issue. Imagine that someone says, 
“Snow is white, but I don’t believe snow is white.” The assertion of such a sentence involves 
Moore’s paradox. Moore’s paradox arises when we say a sentence of the form, “P, but I don’t 
believe p” (Moore, 1993: 207–212). We can push the atheist above to be caught in Moore’s 
paradox. Imagine that he says, “If you worship God, you’ll go to heaven.” We request him to 
declare whether he believes or not what he just said. He declares, “I don’t believe if you 
worship God, you’ll go to heaven.” As a result, he is caught in Moore’s paradox, and he only 
puzzles his audience. The same is true of the scientific realists above. Imagine that they say, 
“Successive paradigms are incommensurable, so present and future scientists would not be 
able to communicate with each other.” We request them to declare whether they believe or 
not what they just said. They declare, “I don’t believe successive paradigms are 
incommensurable, so present and future scientists would not be able to communicate with 
each other.” As a result, they are caught in Moore’s paradox, and they only puzzle their 
audience. 
Kuhn would also be caught in Moore’s paradox if he draws the analogy between the 
development of science and the evolution of organisms without committing to the truth of 
evolutionary theory, pace Bryant. Imagine that Kuhn says, “Organisms don’t evolve towards 
a goal. Similarly, science doesn’t develop towards truths. I, however, don’t believe organisms 
don’t evolve towards a goal.” He says, “Organisms don’t evolve towards a goal. Similarly, 
science doesn’t develop towards truths” in order to draw the analogy between the 
development of science and the evolution of organisms. He says, “I, however, don’t believe 
organisms don’t evolve towards a goal,” in order to express his refusal to believe that 
evolutionary theory is true. It is, however, a Moorean sentence: “Organisms don’t evolve 
towards a goal. I, however, don’t believe organisms don’t evolve towards a goal.” The 
assertion of such a sentence gives rise to Moore’s paradox. 
Scientific antirealists would also be caught in Moore’s paradox, if they explain 
phenomena in terms of a scientific theory without committing to the truth of it, pace van 
Fraassen. Imagine that scientific antirealists say, “The space between two galaxies expands 
because dark energy exists between them, but I don’t believe that dark energy exists between 
two galaxies.” They say, “The space between two galaxies expands because dark energy 
exists between them,” in order to explain why the space between galaxies expands. They add, 
“I don’t believe that dark energy exists between two galaxies,” in order to express their 
refusal to commit to the truth of the theoretical claim that dark energy exists. It is, however, a 
Moorean sentence: “The space between two galaxies expands because dark energy exists 
between them, but I don’t believe that dark energy exists between two galaxies.” Asserting 
such a sentence will only puzzle their audience. Consequently, Moore’s paradox bars 
scientific antirealists from invoking scientific theories to explain phenomena (Park, 2017b: 
383, 2018b: Section 4). 
Researchers on Moore’s paradox believe that “contradiction is at the heart of the 
absurdity of saying a Moorean sentence, but it is not obvious wherein contradiction lies” 
(Park, 2014: 345). Park (2014: 345) argues that when you say, “Snow is white,” your 
audience believe that you believe that snow is white. Their belief that you believe that snow 
is white contradicts the second conjunct of your Moorean sentence that you do not believe 
that snow is white. Thus, the contradiction lies in your audience’s belief and the second 
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conjunct of your Moorean sentence. The present paper does not aim to flesh out and defend 
this view of wherein lies the contradiction. It rather aims to show that Moore’s paradox 
prevents us from using the language of a scientific theory without committing to the truth of 
it, pace Bryant and van Fraassen. 
Set Moore’s paradox aside. Let me raise another objection to Bryant and van Fraassen. 
Imagine that Kuhn encounters a philosopher of mind. The philosopher of mind asserts, “A 
mental state is reducible to a brain state.” Kuhn realizes that the philosopher of mind 
espouses the identity theory of mind, but he knows that the identity theory of mind has 
already been refuted by the multiple realizability argument. So he brings up the multiple 
realizability argument to the philosopher of mind. The philosopher of mind is persuaded of 
the multiple realizability argument and admits that the identity theory is not tenable. To 
Kuhn’s surprise, however, the philosopher of mind claims that when he said, “A mental state 
is reducible to a brain state,” he spoke the language of the identity theory without committing 
to the truth of it, so his position is not refuted by Kuhn. Note that the philosopher of mind 
escapes the refutation of his position by saying that he did not believe what he stated. It is 
also reasonable for the philosopher of mind to escape the refutation of his position by saying 
that he did not believe what he stated, if it is reasonable for Kuhn to escape the refutation of 
his position by saying that he did not believe what he stated. Kuhn would think that it is not 
reasonable for the philosopher of mind to do so. 
Kuhn, however, might bite the bullet, saying that it is reasonable for the philosopher of 
mind to do so. The strategy to avoid the refutation, Kuhn might continue, only reveals that 
the identity theory was not his position after all. Evaluating arguments does not require that 
we identify the beliefs of the authors of arguments. In philosophy, we only need to care about 
whether arguments are valid or invalid, sound or unsound, strong or weak, and so on. 
Speculating about what beliefs the authors of arguments hold as a way of evaluating 
arguments is to implicitly rely on an argument from authority, i.e., it is to think as though the 
authors’ beliefs determine the strength of arguments rather than the form and content of 
arguments do. 
We, however, need to consider under what conditions we accept the conclusion of an 
argument in general. We accept it, when premises are plausible and when the conclusion 
follows from the premises. We can tell whether the conclusion follows from the premises or 
not without the author’s belief that it does. In many cases, however, we cannot tell whether 
premises are plausible or not without the author’s belief that they are. Imagine, for example, 
that a witness states in court that a defendant is guilty because the defendant was in the crime 
scene. The judge can tell whether the conclusion follows from the premise or not without the 
witness’s belief that it does. The judge, however, cannot tell whether the premise is plausible 
or not without the witness’s belief that it is. Imagine that the witness says that the defendant 
is guilty because the defendant was in the crime scene, but that the witness declares that he 
does not believe that the defendant was in the crime scene. Since the witness does not believe 
that the premise is true, the judge has no reason to believe that it is true. It is unreasonable for 
the judge to evaluate the witness’s argument independently of whether the witness believes or 
not that the premise is true. In a nutshell, an argument loses its persuasive force, if the author 
of the argument does not believe that premises are true. Thus, if you aim to convince your 
audience that your argument is cogent, you should believe yourself that the premises are true. 
If you declare that you do not believe that the premises are true, your audience will ask you 
some disconcerting questions: “If you don’t, why should I believe what you don’t? How can 
you say to me what you don’t believe? Do you expect me to believe what you don’t?” (Park, 
2018b: Section 4). 
In case you still think that it is harmless and legitimate to speak what you do not 
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believe, I invite you to imagine that your political rival commits murder to frame you. A false 
charge is brought to you, and you are tried in court. The prosecutor has a strong indictment 
against you. You state vehemently that you did not commit murder. You, however, have no 
physical evidence supporting your statement. Furthermore, you are well-known as a person 
who speaks vehemently what you do not believe. Not surprisingly, the judge issues a death 
sentence on you, thinking that you are merely speaking the language of the innocent. The 
point of this sad story is that speaking what you do not believe may result in a tragedy in 
certain cases. 
Let me now turn to a slightly different, but related, issue. Under what condition can I 
refute your belief when you speak contrary to what you believe? I can do it only when I have 
direct access to your doxastic states, i.e., only when I can identify your beliefs without the 
mediation of your language. It is not enough for me to interpret your language correctly and 
present powerful evidence against what your language conveys. After all, whenever I present 
such evidence to you, you will escape the refutation of what you stated simply by saying that 
you did not believe what you stated. Thus, Bryant’s defense of Kuhn’s position from my 
criticism above amounts to imposing an excessively high epistemic standard on Kuhn’s 
opponents. After all, his opponents do not have direct access to his doxastic states. 
In this context, it is useful to be reminded of the epistemic imperative: “Act only on an 
epistemic maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal one” (Park, 2018c: 3). Consider the maxim “Escape the refutation of your position 
by saying you didn’t believe what you stated.” If you cannot will this maxim to become a 
universal one, you ought not to act on it yourself. It is immoral for you to act on the maxim 
despite the fact that you cannot will it to become a universal maxim. Thus, the epistemic 
imperative can be invoked to argue that Kuhn ought not to use the language of evolutionary 
theory without committing to the truth of it, pace Bryant. 
Let me now raise a slightly different, although related, issue. Recall that according to 
Bryant, Kuhn could adopt the language of evolutionary theory without committing to the 
truth of it. Admittedly, there is an epistemic advantage of not committing to the truth of 
evolutionary theory on Kuhn’s part. The advantage is that he might avoid the risk of forming 
a false belief regarding evolutionary theory. Yet, he can stick to his philosophical account of 
science according to which science does not develop towards truths, and current scientific 
theories will be supplanted by incommensurable alternatives. 
There is, however, an epistemic disadvantage of not committing to the truth of a 
scientific theory. Imagine that Kuhn is not only a philosopher and historian of science but 
also a scientist. He has worked hard for several decades to solve a scientific problem that has 
been plaguing an old scientific theory. Finally, he hits upon a great scientific theory that 
handles the recalcitrant problem. His scientific colleagues reject the old scientific theory and 
accept his new scientific theory, i.e., a scientific revolution occurs. He becomes famous not 
only among scientists but also among the general public. He is so excited about his new 
scientific theory that he believes that it is true. Some philosophers, however, come along and 
dispirit him by saying that they do not believe that his new theory is true, and that they do not 
even believe that it is closer to the truth than its predecessor was. Kuhn protests that his new 
theory has theoretical virtues, such as accuracy, simplicity, and fruitfulness. Not impressed by 
these virtues, however, the philosophers reply that science does not develop towards truths, 
and that his theory will be displaced by an incommensurable alternative. They were exposed 
to Kuhn’s philosophical account of science! 
They have adopted a philosophical position called epistemic reciprocalism according to 
which “we ought to treat our epistemic colleagues, as they treat their epistemic agents” (Park, 
2017a: 57). Epistemic reciprocalists are scientific antirealists’ true adversaries. Scientific 
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antirealists refuse to believe that their epistemic colleagues’ scientific theories are true for 
fear that they might form false beliefs. In return, epistemic reciprocalists refuse to believe 
that scientific antirealists’ positive theories are true for fear that they might form false beliefs. 
We, as epistemic agents, are not only interested in avoiding false beliefs but also in 
propagating “to others our own theories which we are confident about” (Park, 2017a: 58). 
Scientific antirealists achieve the first epistemic goal at the cost of the second epistemic goal. 
Epistemic reciprocalism is built upon the foundation of social epistemology, which 
claims that we are not asocial epistemic agents but social epistemic agents. Social epistemic 
agents are those who interact with each other over the matters of what to believe and what not 
to believe. So they take into account how their interlocutors treat their epistemic colleagues 
before taking epistemic attitudes towards their interlocutors’ positive theories. 
Let me now turn to another of Bryant’s defenses of Kuhn’s position. She says that it is 
not clear that the analogy between the evolution of organisms and the development of science 
is integral to Kuhn’s account. Kuhn could “have ascribed the same characteristics to theory 
change without referring to evolutionary theory at all” (Bryant, 2018: 3). In other words, 
Kuhn’s contention that science does not develop towards truths rises or falls independently of 
the analogy between the development of science and the evolution of organisms. Again, this 
defense of Kuhn’s position is brilliant.  
Consider, however, that the development of science is analogous to the evolution of 
organisms, regardless of whether Kuhn makes use of the analogy to defend his philosophical 
account of science or not, and that the fact that they are analogous is a strike against Kuhn’s 
philosophical account of science. Suppose that Kuhn believes that science does not develop 
towards truths, but that he does not believe that organisms do not evolve towards a goal, 
despite the fact that the development of science is analogous to the evolution of organisms. 
An immediate objection to his position is that it is not clear on what grounds he embraces the 
philosophical claim about science, but not the scientific claim about organisms, when the two 
claims parallel each other. It is ad hoc merely to suggest that the scientific claim is 
untrustworthy, but that the philosophical claim is trustworthy. What is so untrustworthy about 
the scientific claim, but so trustworthy about the philosophical claim? It would be difficult to 
answer these questions because the development of science and the evolution of organisms 
are similar to each other. A moral is that if philosophers reject our best scientific theories, 
they cannot make philosophical claims that are similar to what our best scientific theories 
assert. In general, the more philosophers reject scientific claims, the more impoverished their 
philosophical positions will be, and the heavier their burdens will be to prove that their 
philosophical claims are dissimilar to the scientific claims that they reject.  
Moreover, it is not clear what Kuhn could say to scientists who take the opposite 
position in response to him. They believe that organisms do not evolve towards a goal, but 
refuse to believe that science does not develop towards truths. To go further, they trust 
scientific claims, but distrust philosophical claims. They protest that it is a manifestation of 
philosophical arrogance to suppose that philosophical claims are worthy of beliefs, but 
scientific claims are not.  
This possible response to Kuhn reminds us of the Golden Rule: Treat others as you 
want to be treated. Philosophers ought to treat scientists as they want to be treated, 
concerning epistemic matters. Suppose that a scientific claim is similar to a philosophical 
claim. If philosophers do not want scientists to hold a double standard with respect to the 
scientific and philosophical claims, philosophers should not hold a double standard with 
respect to them. There “is no reason for thinking that the Golden Rule ranges over moral 
matters, but not over epistemic matters” (Park, 2018d: 77–78). Again, we are not asocial 
epistemic agents but social epistemic agents. As such, we ought to behave in accordance with 
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the epistemic norms governing the behavior of social epistemic agents. 
Finally, the present paper is intended to be critical of Kuhn’s philosophy of science 
while enshrining his insight that science is a social enterprise, and that scientists are social 
epistemic agents. I appealed to Moore’s paradox, epistemic reciprocalism, the epistemic 
imperative, and the Golden Rule in order to undermine Bryant’s defenses of Kuhn’s position 
from my criticism. All these theoretical resources can be used to increase our understanding 
of science as a social endeavor. Let me add to Kuhn’s insight that philosophers are also social 
epistemic agents. 
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